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INTRODUCTION

Following the conclusion of the seventh series of multilateral
trade negotiations (MTN) held under the auspices of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),1 the Tokyo Round was
concluded in April, 1979. 2 The U.S. Congress approved the negotiated agreements and passed implementing legislation in the Trade
Agreements Act of 1979.3 On January l, 1980, Title I of the Act,
which contains the revisions to the antidumping and countervailing duty provisions and expressly repeals the Antidumping Act of
1921, 4 became law.
A unique, if constitutionally unforeseen, sequence was followed
to enact the Trade Agreements Act of 1979. In the Kennedy
Round of the MTN a decade ago, the administration formulated a
code elaborating upon the sparse GATT language concerning antidumping measures. Congress, however, was not receptive to the
code. It had not been consulted prior to or during the negotiations
and saw nothing useful in the final product. The result was Hill
hostility toward the notion of a code and legislation that provided,
in essence, that U.S. adherence to the code was acceptable only if
no provisions of U.S. law were adversely affected by the document
or by the work of the GATT Antidumping Committee.
* B.A., Hamilton College (1976); J.D., M.B.A., University of Pennsylvania (1980). Currently an associate with the New York law firm of Hughes Hubbard & Reed.
1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, done October 30, 1947, 61 Stat. (effective Jan. l, 1948) A3, T.l.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. For detailed discussion and analysis
of GATT, see J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 35-57 (1969).
2. For background on the Tokyo Round, see Wolff, The U.S. Mandate for Trade
Negotiations, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 505 (1976). The text of the agreements was published in
Message from the President of the United States, AGREEMENTS REACHED IN THE TOKYO
ROUND OF THE MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, H.R. Doc. No. 153, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. 1 (1979) [hereinafter cited as MTA).
3. Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (1979) (codified in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.)
[hereinafter cited as Trade Agreements Act].
4. Id., Title I, § 106 (repealing 19 U .S.C. §§ 160-173 (1976)).
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In enacting the Trade Reform Act of 1974, 5 Congress sought
to avoid a repetition of this conflict. The Act specifically provided
for continuous congressional consultation throughout the negotiations of the Tokyo Round and, to avoid the debacle that followed
the Kennedy Round, 6 further provided for a novel legislative procedure under which the entire package negotiated in the MTN
was either to be accepted in toto or rejected within a ninety-day
period. No amendments could be offered in committee or on the
floor. 7
Congress did participate in the negotiations of the Tokyo
Round. It was consulted in closed "mark-up" sessions of the relevant congressional committees which engaged in the preparation
of "statements of administrative action" designed to indicate the
way in which the law would be implemented. 8 The accompanying
committee reports were negotiated and drafted together with administration representatives.
This article will examine the antidumping provisions of the
Trade Agreements Act of 1979 as they reflect the MTN Antidumping Code concluded in the Tokyo Round and will consider the
potential impact of the new U.S. antidumping statute upon the
trade of multinational corporations (MNCs) and less-developedcountries (LDCs).

IL

ANT/DUMPING MEASURESUNDERLYING PRINCIPLES

The economic theory of antidumping laws has been the subject of prior scholarly discussion. 9 The classic definition of dump5. Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975) (codified in scattered sections of 5, 19
U.S.C.). For a comprehensive, section by section analysis of the Act, see Campbell, The
Foreign Trade Aspects of the Trade Act of 1974 (Part J), 33 WASH. & LEE L . REV. 325 (1976);
Campbell, The Foreign Trade Aspects of the Trade Act of 1974 (Part JI), 33 WASH & LEE L.
REV. 639 (1976).
6. The Tokyo Declaration, as a result, made indirect reference to the need, based on .
past experience, for assurances that the United States would implement its international
commitments. Declaration of Ministers approved at Tokyo on 14 September 1973, paras. l, 4
GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS (20th Supp.) 19, 21 (1974).
7. 19
§§ 2112, 2191-94 (1976).
8. TRADE AGREEMENTS ACT OF 1979 STATEMENTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, H.R.
Doc. No. 96-153, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2 (1979) [hereinafter cited as STATEMENTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION].
9. See Note, Dumping by State-Controlled-Economy Countries: The Polish Golf
Cart Case and the New Treasury Regulations, 128 U. PA. L . REV. 217, 221 (1979). See
generally, MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD., ANTIDUMPING LAW: POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION

u.s.c.
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ing is "price discrimination between national markets." 10 Dumping
is perceived to occur when a foreign producer sells his goods in an
export target market at prices lower than those of the same goods
sold in the home market. 11 From a theoretical, economic viewpoint,
dumping is not evil per se. If a continuous flow of less expensive
goods were guaranteed, no harm would result because injury to
the target market's domestic industry would be offset by the
benefit of a constant supply of inexpensive goods. 12 However, if
the foreign producer raises the prices of his goods to artificially
high and noncompetitive levels once the target market's domestic
competition has been eliminated or substantially curtailed, the
long range injury to competition in the target market outweighs
the temporary benefit of lower prices.
According to the theoretical proponents of international free
trade policy, unfettered international competition will maximize
efficiency and result in lower prices as each nation comes to
specialize in producing those products for which it is best suited. 13
On the other hand, "predatory" dumping to capture a share of a
target market by undercutting domestic competitors is viewed as
inimicable to "free trade" and as constituting an unfair trade practice against which nations espousing free trade principles may
legitimately defend their domestic industry. In keeping with the
policy of international free trade, all imports that undersell
domestic goods are not held to be subject to dumping sanctions.
Only those imports that undersell domestic goods by exploiting an
artificial or anticompetitive advantage are subject to sanctions. 14
(1979); Ehrenhaft, Protection Against International Price Discrimination, 58 CoLUM. L.
REV. 44 (1958).
10. J. VINER, DUMPING: A PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 3 (1923).
11. See Barcelo, Antidumping Laws as Barriers to Trade-The United States and
the International Dumping Code, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 491, 494 (1972).
12. Id.; see Anthony, The American Response to Dumping from Capitalist and

Socialist Economics-Substantive Premises, and Restructured Procedures After the 1967
GATT Code, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 159, 163-77 (1969).
13. Id. See also P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 668-91 (10th ed. 1976); Coudert, The Application of the United States Antidumping Law in the Light of a Liberal Trade Policy, 65
COLUM. L. REV. 189 (1965).
14. In theory, a foreign manufacturer could dump his goods in the United States even
though he sold them at prices equal to or higher than his domestic competitors. Dumping
that does not undersell prices charged by domestic competitors is labeled "technical dumping" and does not result in a finding of injury. See Vinyl Clad Fence Fabric from Canada, 40
Fed. Reg. 51, 243, 244-45 (1975) (concurring statement of reasons of Comm'rs Moore and
Ablondi).
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However, price discriminatory exports are presumed exploitative
on the assumption that lower export prices are subsidized by
higher prices elsewhere and thus do not reflect the "fair value" of
the goods. 15
This presumption underlies the Trade Agreements Act. The
premise of the antidumping law is that if a foreign producer sells
goods at a given price in his home market, he ought not to sell for
less in the United States if the effect of such sales is to injure .U.S.
producers of like merchandise. 16 At the root of the implementation
of the Act is the notion that U.S. producers of goods that are competitive with imports are entitled to government-imposed protection against "unfair" foreign competition and predatory pricing
practices. 11 In keepiiig with the traditional concept of price
discrimination, the Trade Agreements Act focuses entirely on the
difference in prices charged by the individual foreign producer in
its domestic and foreign markets. 18 The element of predation
which was absent in the Antidumping Act of 1921 is lacking in the
Trade Agreements Act as well. 19
It is noteworthy that dumping does not exist merely because
a foreign producer undersells domestic competition. On the other
hand, dumping is not avoided where the foreign producer meets
the price charged in his target market. The U.S. antidumping law
limits examination to the difference in prices charged by the producer in his home market and in the U.S. market. The fact that the
producer lacks competition in his home market and may, because
of this or for other reasons, be able to command higher prices
15. The fair value of goods is normally understood as cost plus profit. See Feller, The
Antidumping Act and the Future of East-West Trade, 66 MICH. L. REV. 115, 118 (1967).
16. See H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1979) [hereinafter cited as H.R.
REP. No. 317].
17. Id. at 43, 44.
18. Id. at 44-45.
19. The Antidumping Act of 1916, 15 U.S.C. §§ 71-77 (1976), does require "intent to
injure" as an element of both its criminal and civil offenses, but the problem of proving such
intent has rendered that statute a virtual dead letter, and it has never been successfully invoked. Hiscocks, International Price Discrimination: The Discovery of the Predatory
Dumping Act of 1916, 11 INT'L LAW. 227, 232 (1977). Moreover, potential complainants are
loathe to initiate such proceedings because antitrust counterclaims that are burdensome to
defend and may result in liability are common. See Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 474 F.
Supp. 168, 179 (D. Del. 1979) (held that the Polish golf cart manufacturer and its domestic
distributor's counterclaim alleging a conspiracy to submit knowingly false information to the
Treasury Department and the U.S. Customs Service, resulting in assessment of dumping
duties, was sufficient to state a claim under section 1 of the Sherman Act against former
domestic manufacturer).
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there than in the United States, is irrelevant and provides no
defense to a charge of price discrimination. 20 Rather, it can be
argued that the higher priced home market sales which enable the
foreign producer to offer the lower priced goods that injure competitors in the United States are thus precisely the "evil" against
which the law is aimed. If the foreign producer were to lower his
home market price to the same level as that charged in the U.S., it
could not afford to "dump." 21 It is similarly irrelevant that foreign
producers, like their American counterparts, occasionally sell at a
loss to preserve investments or meet fixed costs or because their
product is affected by natural forces such as the maturation cycle
of agricultural produce.

/IL

THE ANT/DUMPING CODE FORMULATED
IN THE TOKYO ROUND

The code on antidumping negotiated during the Tokyo
Round 22 requires that antidumping proceedings be brought "by or
on behalf' of a domestic industry. The code recognizes that antidumping practices should "not constitute an unjustifiable impediment to international trade" and that antidumping duties "may be
applied only ... [where] dumping causes or threatens material injury to an established industry or materially retards the establishment of an industry" and furthermore calls for "equitable and
open procedures in the examination of dumping cases" and for the
"speedy, effective and equitable resolution" of dumping disputes. 23
The MTN Antidumping Agreement, in its provisions concerning the determination of injury, provides that the determination of
an injurious impact on a domestic industry should include evaluation of "all relevant economic factors and indices that have a bear20. Ehrenhaft, What the A ntidumping and Countervailing Duty Provisions of the
Trade Agreements Act [Can] [Will] [Should] Mean for U.S. Trade Policy, 11 LAW & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 1361, 1363 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Antidumping and Trade Policy].
21. See Ehrenhaft, Protection Against International Price Discrimination: United
States Countervailing and Antidumping Duties," 58 COLUM. L. REV. 44, 49 (1958).
22. International Antidumping Code, done June 30, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 4348, T.I.A.S. No.
6431 (effective July l, 1968); MTN, Antidumping: Agreement on Implementation of Article
VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade MTN/NTM/W/232, done April 9, 1979,
!hereinafter cited as Antidumping Agreement], reprinted in MTA, supra note 2, at 311-37.
23. Id., reprinted in MT A, supra note 2, at 312. The antidumping code also calls for
contracting parties to take into account "the particular trade development and financial
nt>t•ds of developing countries" and recommends the establishment of alternative, construct ivt• remedies where LDC's are involved in dumping cases. Id.
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ing on the state of the industry," including actual and potential
decline in output, sales, market share, profits, productivity, return
on investments or utilization of capacity as well as factors affecting domestic prices such as actual and potential negative effects
on cash flow, inventories, employment, wages, growth, and ability
to raise capital or investments. 24 The Agreement calls for a determination that injury to domestic industry is caused by the dumped
imports and not by other factors which are not attributable to imported merchandise. 25 Thus, the Agreement calls for a finding that
(a) dumping has occurred; (b) material injury or retardation has occurred; and (c) a direct causal link between the dumped imports
and the alleged injury can be established.
One participant in the recent MTN has observed that, on the
national level, the ultimate success of the Tokyo Round will depend upon "the willingness of governments to resist domestic protectionist pressures and [the reestablishment of] a basis for
responding to worldwide economic problems with negotiation
rather than 'beggar your neighbor' mercantilism." 26 An analysis of
the U.S. Trade Agreements Act reveals the extent to which protectionist sentiment continues to outweigh the principles of free
trade.

IV. ANALYSIS OF KEY SECTIONS OF THE
ANT/DUMPING PROVISIONS OF THE TRADE
AGREEMENTS ACT OF 1979
The Trade Agreements Act abolished the Antidumping Act
of 1921 27 and replaced it with a new antidumping statute which
was enacted in the form of amendments to the Tariff Act of 1930.28
24. Antidumping Agreement, supra note 22, pt. I, art. 3, para. 3, reprinted in MT A,
supra note 2, at 315.
25. Id. pt. I, art. 3, para. 4, reprinted in MT A, supra note 2, at 315.
26. Graham, Reforming the International Trading System: The Tokyo Round Trade
Negotiations in the Final State, 12 CORNELL INT'L L.J. l, 3 (1979). See also Graham, Results
of the Tokyo Round, 9 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 153 (1979).
27. 19 U.S.C. § 160-171. The Antidumping Act of 1921 was originally directed toward
the elimination of international price discrimination practiced at the time by large European
cartels. Its purpose was to protect U.S. industry from the dumping of goods at less than cost
or home value. It provided for the imposition of dumping duties on imports sold in the U.S.
market at "less than fair value," if, as a result of such imports, a U.S. industry was "being or
likely to be injured, or [was] prevented from being established." See Victor, United States
Antidumping Rules, 10 ST. MARY'S L. J. 217 (1978).
28. Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1202-1654 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Tariff Act of 1930].
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The new statute encompasses the transfer of authority to regulate
antidumping duties from the Treasury Department and the U.S.
Customs Service to the International Trade Administration of the
Department of Commerce 29 and provides both substantive and procedural changes to U.S. antidumping law. These changes will likely have a significant impact on trade involving the United States
and other countries, LDC's and multinational corporations. It may
be criticized as providing too many concessions to domestic industries which may seek the imposition of protectionist trade barriers.
Under the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, dumping occurs
when a foreign producer exports and sells goods in the United
States at less than fair value. 30 If such sales are taking place and
are causing or threatening to cause material injury 31 to an industry in the United States, or if the sales are materially retarding the establishment of a domestic industry, then an antidumping
duty is added with the aim of bringing the United States sales
price of the foreign goods into line with the fair value of the merchandise. 32
Under the terms of the new legislation, an antidumping duty
will be imposed whenever the administering authority determines
"that a class or kind of foreign merchandise is being sold or is likely to be sold in the U.S. at less than its fair value" and the International Trade Commission determines that an industry in the
United States is "materially injured, or is threatened with
material injury, or the establishment of an industry in the U.S. is
materially retarded." 33 Ordinarily, the amount of the duty to be imposed is "an amount equal to the amount by which the foreign
market value exceeds the United States price 34 for the merchandise."35
29. The International Trade Administration published its regulations concerning antidumping duties in 45 Fed. Reg. 8,182-8,208 (February 6, 1980) (codified in 19 C.F.R. § 353 et
seq.).

30. Trade Agreements Act, supra note 3, § 731 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673).
31. Id. The requirement that the injury be "material" is a major innovation of the
1979 Act. See H.R. REP. No. 317, supra note 16, at 45-49.
32. See Trade Agreements Act, supra note 3, at§ 731 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673).
33. Id.
34. The Trade Agreements Act adopts a new term "United States Price" which
incorporates the previous concepts of "purchase price" and "exporter's sales price" under
the Antidumping Act of 1921 but does not change their meaning. Id. at§ 772 (codified at 19
U.S.C. § 1677a).
35. Id. at§ 731 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673).
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The principal substantive change in the Act is the substitution of "material injury" for "injury" as the standard by which the
International Trade Commission determines whether less than
fair value imports have injured domestic industry. Under the
prior law the requisite showing of injury did not require materiality.36 This new standard may require a slightly higher level of injury to be shown than was the case under the Antidumping Act of
1921.37
Notably, the Trade Agreements Act, in its definition of "injury," fails to assess domestic conditions of competition or levels
of prices, technology, adaptation to changing demand or other
factors which may injure domestic industry 38 and rests upon the
concept of "overall" injury. It does not require that dumping be
the principal or even major cause of injury but permits a finding of
injury upon the barest causal link. The Act does not require that
the complainant or its industry as a whole be operated efficiently
and does not expose the complainant to counterclaims for its own
possible violation of trade regulation laws. 39 It further fails to require "clean hands" in determining whether relief should be
withheld because the domestic industry is also dumping in foreign
countries. 4° Finally, under the Act domestic producers may occa36. "Material injury" is defined as "harm which is not inconsequential, immaterial or
unimportant." Id. at § 771(7) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)).
37. But see the SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE REPORT ON THE TRADE AGREEMENTS ACT,
S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 87-89 (1979) [hereinafter cited as S. REP No. 249), indicating that Congress does not expect the inclusion of the term "material" to significantly
alter the decisions of the International Trade Commission from previous practice: "[T]he
ITC determinations with respect to the injury criterion under existing law ... have been, on
the whole, consistent with the material injury criterion of this bill." Id. at 87.
38. The MTN code on antidumping provides that administrators of antidumping laws
consider "other factors" that may cause injury. Antidumping Agreement, supra note 22, pt.
I, at 3, para. 3, reprinted in MTA, supra note 2, at 315. However, the House Report does
recommend consideration of other factors. H.R. REP. No. 317, supra note 16, at 47. The
original draft of the ITC's proposed regulations under the Trade Agreements Act did not
mention other factors, 44 Fed. Reg. 59392, 59404 (1979) (proposed regulation 19 C.F.R. §
207.26). However, after intense criticism, the ITC's final rules on injury did include a
reference to "other factors" that the Commission "will also take into account." 44 Fed. Reg.
76,458, 76,473 (1979) (codified at 19 C.F.R. § 207.27).
39. The Act provides no immunity against antitrust claims. Under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, however, the mere invocation of legal procedures against competitors may be
protected by the First Amendment, Eastern R.R. President Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight,
Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 136-40 (1961); United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S.
657, 669-70 (1965), unless the proceedings constitute a "sham" used to harass competition,
California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 515-16 (1972).
40. Ehrenhaft, Antidumping and Trade Policy, supra note 20, at 1378 (footnotes
omitted).
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sionally sell portions of their output below cost while, at the same
time, claiming that similar selling techniques by foreign exporters
constitute dumping. Thus, a domestic industry may be suffering
injury from a variety of factors, but so long as dumped imports is
one of them, the ITC can make an affirmative injury determination.
Additionally, the Trade Agreements Act now permits, in the
absence of sales in the home market, the use of constructed value
(based on costs of production) in the determination of home market
value,' 1 even where third-country export price information is
available. Under the old law the Treasury Department, in the
absence of sales in the home market, could not use constructed
value unless it first determined that there was insufficient information to determine a third-country export price.'2
The principal procedural changes in the antidumping law embodied in the Trade Agreements Act relate to shortened time
periods during the investigative phase of proceedings, 43 detailed
provisions concerning the suspension of investigations," the imposition of time limits on the liquidation of entries subject to the
assessment of antidumping duties,'5 yearly administrative review
of outstanding suspension agreements and antidumping duty
orders,'6 and judicial review of interlocutory and final decisions.'7
While the accelerated time periods contained in the Act may be
praised as providing for the "prompt administration of justice,"
serious questions may be proffered as to precisely how just such
provisions are. It has been posited that the accelerated time frame
within which antidumping investigations are to be completed and
the expansion of judicial review of both interlocutory and final
decisions provided in the Act were prompted by protectionist
sentiment,'8 for Congress adopted these reforms without any
41. Trade Agreements Act § 773(e) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e)).
42. Although the Trade Agreements Act provides the administering authority with
the discretion to use constructed value as it deems appropriate it is not likely to alter the
existing preference for third-country export value over constructed value. Remarks of Noel
Hemmendinger, District of Columbia Bar, Continuing Legal Education Program on the
Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Feb. 5, 1980.
43. Trade Agreements Act, supra note 3, at §§ 732-733 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§
1673a-1673b ).
44. Id., at§ 734 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1671c).
45. Id., at§§ 735-40 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673d-1673i).
46. Id., at § 751 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1675).
47. Id., at§§ 1001, 516A (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1516a).
48. Ehrenhaft, Antidumping and Trade Policy, supra note 20, at 1381.

Published by SURFACE, 1980

9

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 7, No. 2 [1980], Art. 7

248

Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com.

[Vol. 7:239

study of the impact of the existing antidumping laws and administrative procedures or of whether accelerated (and perhaps more
arbitrary) decision-making would provide any meaningful improvement. 49
The Act provides that the Commerce Department may initiate an investigation whenever it determines that an investigation
is warranted, or that an investigation must be initiated within 20
days 50 after an "interested party" 51 files a petition on behalf of a
domestic industry.52 While the Trade Agreements Act reflects the
MTN antidumping code requirement that antidumping pro·
ceedings be brought "by or on behalf of the industry ," 53 the Act
arguably goes further in defining the classes of potential complainants by giving standing to labor unions to file complaints and
participate in proceedings. 54 This furtherance may result in significantly increased filings.
49. However, a report published by the General Accounting Office in 1979 found
seven cases in the 17 cases it studied where exporters accelerated shipments when an antidumping proceeding was initiated in order to "beat" the subsequent withholding of
appraisement notice. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, U.S. ADMINISTRATION OF THE ANTIDUMPING ACT OF 1921: REPORT TO THE CONGRESS BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL 9-10 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as GAO Report]. To address the problem of increased shipments pending
withholding of appraisement, the Trade Agreements Act now contains provisions for the
retroactive application of dumping duties when such "critical circumstances" are
demonstrated. Trade Agreements Act, supra note 3, at § 703(e) (codified at 19 U.S.C. §
1671b(e)).
50. This represents a reduction of 10 days from the old initiation period.
51. "Interested party" includes domestic manufacturers, producers or wholesalers of
a like product, labor unions or other groups of workers representative of an industry
engaged in the manufacture, production or wholesale sale of a like product and trade or
business associations, the majority of whose members manufacture, produce or wholesale a
like product in the United States. Trade Agreements Act, supra note 3, § 771(9) (codified at
19 U.S.C. § 1677(9)). The Act also encourages governmental assistance to potential complainants in the filing of petitions. The administering authority has the responsibility "to
advise and to assist private parties, as appropriate, before they file the petition." S. REP.
No. 249, supra note 37, at 63.
52. Trade Agreements Act, supra note 3, at § 732(b)(l) (codified at 19 U.S.C. §
1673a(b)(l)).
53. Antidumping Agreement, pt. I, art. 5, para. 1, reprinted in MT A, supra note 22, at
317. The Trade Agreements Act provides: "An antidumping proceeding shall be commenced
whenever an interested party . . . files a petition with the administering authority, on behalf
of an industry, which alleges the elements necessary for the imposition of the duty . . ."Id.
at § 732(b)(l) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(b)(l)).
54. Under the Trade Agreements Act, "producers" includes labor and "interested·
parties" includes unions, a majority of whose members manufacture, produce or wholesale a
product "like" the ones imported. Id. at§§ 702(b), 771(9)(0) (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671a(b),
1677(9)(D)). See also H.R. REP. No. 317, supra note 16, at 50.
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Within 45 days of the filing of any petition or of initiation, the
ITC must reach a determination as to whether there is a "reasonable indication" that a U.S. industry is threatened with or is being
materially injured or has been materially retarded by reason of
imported merchandise. 55 Thus, unlike prior law, the ITC will now
make a determination in every case. Since the standard for a preliminary affirmative decision is low, it is likely that few cases will
be terminated on the basis of the ITC's initial review.
The Act contains shortened time periods to insure that investigations are completed as quickly as possible.56 Antidumping
proceedings are generally to be concluded within 300 days, approximately 100 days more quickly than under the Antidumping
Act of 1921. Moreover, the 3-to 3 1/z-year delay between the entry
of goods subject to a finding and an assessment of dumping duties
was harshly criticized by the congressional committees which
directed that all assessments be concluded within a period preferably as short as six months but in no event longer than two
years after entry. 57 The charts contained in the Appendix contrast
the time periods under the Antidumping Act of 1921 and the
Trade Agreements Act of 1979.
The new, shortened time limits concerning antidumping investigations impose substantial burdens on submission by importers and foreign manufacturers. If such submissions are not
made in a timely manner, a decision will be made on the basis of
the best information available, including the information supplied
by the domestic complainant. Thus, while a domestic industry or
interested party may file an antidumping action at any time which
it determines is propitious, the importer or foreign producer has a
short time in which to respond and will likely be adversely affected if it does not respond within the allotted time.
As under the Antidumping Act of 1921, whenever the administering authority makes a affirmative determination of lessthan-fair-value (LTFV) sales, liquidation must be suspended for all
55. Trade Agreements Act, supra note 3, at§ 703(a) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1671b(a)).
This provision differs from 19 U.S.C. § 160(c)(2) of the Antidumping Act of 1921 where the
ITC made a preliminary determination only where the Treasury Department referred the
matter in cases where a "substantial doubt" of injury existed.
56. Id. at§§ 732-733 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673a-1673b).
57. Id. at§ 736(a) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673(a)). See H.R. REP. No. 317, supra note
16, at 69; S. REP. No. 249, supra note 37, at 66.
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entries of merchandise subject to the determination. 58 Under the
new provisions, however, a cash deposit may be required in lieu of
a bond.59 The statute also provides for retroactive withholding of
appraisement in "critical circumstances" where the Commerce
Department determines that there is a history of dumping in the
U.S. or the importer knew or should have known that the exporter
was selling at LTFV and, in addition, massive imports of merchandise subject to the investigation had taken place over a relatively
short period of time. 60
Once a preliminary determination is made by the Commerce
Department, and absent the suspension or termination of an investigation, 81 it is forwarded to the International Trade Commission for a material injury determination. 82 Upon an affirmative
ITC finding of material injury and the issuance of a dumping
order, dumping duties may be imposed.83 Under previous practice
entries were to be liquidated within one year subject to administrative extensions,84 however, final assessments were frequently
not imposed until years after a final dumping order. The Trade
Agreements Act provides formal time limits for assessments 85 and
requires the payment of the entire amount of the estimated dump58. Trade Agreements Act, supra note 3, §§ 736-738 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§
1673e-1673g). If the preliminary determination is negative, security is not required to be
posted until and unless there is a final determination of LTFV sales.
59. Id. Under the Antidumping Act of 1921, when liquidation was suspended the
importer was required to post a bond in an amount determined by the Secretary of
Treasury.
60. Id. at§ 733(e) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(e)).
61. The Commerce Department may suspend an investigation on the acceptance of an
agreement by exporters accounting for "substantially all" of the goods under consideration
whereby they agree to eliminate all LTFV sales or cease exports to the U.S. entirely or to
eliminate completely the injurious effects of the imports upon the relevant U.S. industry.
Trade Agreements Act, supra note 3, at § 734 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673c). The term
"substantially all," according to the Congressional Committee Reports, refers to exporters
responsible for no less than 85 percent of the total volume of merchandise subject to the investigation in the most recent representative period. H.R. No. 317, supra note 16, at 64; S.
REP. No. 249, supra note 32, at 71; see also Statement of Administrative Action, supra note
8, at 31.
62. Trade Agreements Act, supra note 3, at§ 732(d) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(d)).
63. Id. at§§ 736-738 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673e-1673g).
64. Tariff Act of 1930, supra note 28, at § 504 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1504).
65. Duties must be assessed with 6 months after "satisfactory" information upon
which an assessment may be based has been received, but in no event later than 12 months
after the manufacturer's accounting period within which the merchandise entered or no
later than 12 months after the manufacturer's or exporter's accounting period within which
merchandise is sold to someone other than the exporter. Trade Agreements Act, supra note
3, at§ 736 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673e).
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ing duty on entry based upon the LTFV margin found in the final
dumping order. 66 These provisions will likely shorten the time
frame and significantly increase the amount of money required to
be paid as duties.
The Act significantly expands the requirements for administrative and judicial review of determinations by the Commerce
Department and the International Trade Commission. 67 In terms of
administrative review, the new law provides for a yearly review
of the suspension of investigation agreements as well as of the
amount of a dumping duty which thereby causes a redetermination of the foreign market value and the United States price of
each entry subject to an order and the amount by which the
foreign market value exceeds the price. 68 These periodic reviews
are designed to insure that the amount of dumping duties imposed
will reflect current dumping margins. Further, upon the assertion
of "changed circumstances," an interested party may request
Commerce Department review of an affirmative final determination of LTFV sales, a determination to suspend an investigation
pursuant to an exporter's agreement, an ITC determination of
material injury or retardation, or an ITC determination that a
suspension agreement eliminated the injurious effects of imports
upon domestic industry. 69
The judicial review provisons contained in the Trade Agree66. Id. at§§ 736-738 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673e-167Sg). This provision permits the
temporary posting of a bond for up to 90 days after publication of the final order during
which time the importer must provide information on which to determine the duty. At the
end of the 90-day period, or as soon as a basis for the duty has been determined, estimated
duties must be paid in full. It is interesting to note that the E.E.C. antidumping rules
provide that an antidumping duty may be less than the LTFV margin if such lesser duty
would be adequate to remedy the injury. O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 93) (1968); O.J. EuR. COMM.
(Spec. Ed.) (1968), as amended by O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 160) (1977), However the U.S. law
requires a duty equivalent to the margin irrespective of its adequacy to remedy the injury.
67. Trade Agreements Act, supra note 3, at §§ 751, 516A (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§
1675, 1516a).
68. The extent of both the margins involved and of compliance are subject to review.
The Commerce Department may order reinstitution of an investigation if it is dissatisfied
with the extent of compliance. Id. at§ 751(a) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)).
69. Id. at§ 751(b) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1675(b)). However, a Commerce Department
review of an affirmative final determination of LTFV sales or suspension of an investigation
pursuant to an agreement, or ITC review of its material injury determination or of a
suspension agreement, may not occur until 24 months have elapsed since the publication of
the determination of suspension, absent "good cause" for an early review. H.R. REP. No.
317, 1vpra note 16, at 72.
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ments Act provide increased rights of review of both final and
interlocutory determinations made in the course of an antidumping investigation. 70 Most of the rights of review are, however,
accorded exclusively to the domestic industry, and exporters are
accorded more limited rights to appeal decisions which affect them
adversely. The Act permits an interested party to go to the U.S.
Customs Court for interlocutory review of legal conclusions or
underlying factual findings concerning a Commerce Department
determination that a case is extraordinarily complicated and that
the time limits for the investigation must be extended, a
preliminary determination that no LTFV margins exist, a determination by either the ITC or Commerce Department not to
review a prior determination or suspension agreement upon an
assertion of "changed circumstances," or an ITC determination
that an industry is not being material injured, threatened with
material injury or materially retarded. 71 Review of final determinations by the ITC on material injury or by the Commerce
Department on LTFV are judicially reviewable 72 as under the Antidumping Act of 1921. 78
The review process embodied in the Trade Agreements Act
may be criticized as unfair to importers and foreign producers.
The Act provides that if an initial decision is reached by the Commerce Department adverse to an importer or foreign producer, it
cannot be appealed until the end of the proceeding. However, if a
preliminary determination is made that no dumping has occurred,
the domestic complainant can immediately appeal to the Customs
Court. It may be argued that there is no incentive for an exporter
to appeal since there is no reason to appeal a decision not to initiate an investigation. Further, an appeal prior to a final determination would be costly and would provide serious time delays.
Notwithstanding these concerns, the review provisions do operate
to the advantage of domestic industry complainants who seek the
imposition of dumping duties.
70. The applicable standard of review is whether such determinations were "unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law."
Trade Agreements Act, supra note 3, §§ 516A(a)(l), (2), (b)(l)(B) (codified at 19 U.S.C. §
1516a(a)(l), (2), (b)(l)(B)).
71. Id. at§ 771(a) (codified at 19 U.S.C. 1677 (a)). "Interested party" includes unions,
trade or business associations and the government of the exporting country.
72. Id. at lOOla(a)(l), (2), (b)(l)(B) (codified at 19 U.S.C. 1516a(a)(l), (b)(l)(B)).
73. Id. The periodic review by the Commerce Department of LTFV sales or of suspension agreements may be judicially reviewed as well.
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POTENTIAL IMPACT ON THE OPERATIONS OF
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS

Numerous corporations which were formerly considered
"American" have established international strategic approaches
to ascertain the least expensive inputs and best markets for their
products. As a result of increased global integration, occasions
have arisen where separate operations of a single multinational
corporate entity were positioned on opposite sides of an antidumping controversy .74 For examples, potash from Canada was
produced by the same MNC's that owned facilities in the U.S.
which were allegedly injured by the dumping of the Canadian product, 75 and Ford automobiles manufactured in Europe have been
the subject of a U.S. antidumping investigation. 76
The Trade Agreements Act has significantly altered the
treatment of dumping controversies where multinational corporations are involved. The Antidumping Act of 1921 assumed the existence of separate "home" or "third" country and domestic
markets in which price levels could be independently determined.77 While the assumption was valid in many cases where
necessary isolation of markets and freedom to set prices occurred,
this assumption failed in its application to the operation ·of
MNC's 78 where independent markets are blurred and may be regarded as part of a worldwide market. 79 The Antidumping Act of
74. Ehrenhaft, Multinational Enterprises and the Antidumping Law, 20 HARV. INT'L
L. J. 277 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Ehrenhaft, Multinational Enterprises].
75. Potassium Chloride from Canada, 34 Fed. Reg. 19,003 (1969) (Determination of
Sales at Less Than Fair Value); 34 Fed. Reg. 13,670 (1969) (Tariff Commission Determination
of Injury and Likelihood of Injury).
76. Automobiles from West Germany, 41 Fed. Reg. 34,989 (1976) (Discontinuance of
Antidumping Investigation).
77. The price in the domestic United States market of imported merchandise was called
the "purchase price" and was defined as "the price at which such merchandise has been
purchased or agreed to be purchased, prior to the time of exportation, by the person by
whom or for whose account the merchandise is imported." 19 U.S.C. § 162(a) (1976). The
price in foreign markets was called the "foreign market value" and was defined as
the price, at the time of exportation of such merchandise to the United States, at
which such or similar merchandise is sold or, in the absence of sales, offered for
sale in the principal markets of the country from which exported, .... or, .... the
price at which so sold or offered for sale for exportation to countries other than
the United States.
19 U.S.C. § 164(a) (1976).
78. Ehrenhaft, Multinational Enterprises, supra note 74, at 280-81.
79. In the course of an antidumping proceeding, the Treasury was required to determine whether merchandise was being, or was likely to be, sold in the United States at less
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1921 presumed that a foreign producer did not have an affiliated
U.S. reseller 80 and failed to address intracorporate transfer pricing
at less than arm's length. 81 The law required that investigation
and computation be based on the price charged in the first sale by
the MNC's U.S. seller to an unrelated party. From that price all of
the company's costs, extending backward to include the producer's presumed "foreign export price," were deducted prior to
comparison with the home-market price of the foreign producer. 82
The Trade Reform Act of 1974 did consider the application of the
antidumping law to MNC's, particularly where MNC's use overall
company profits as "subsidies" to offset unfairly low prices in the
United States. 83 However, its attempt to address the issue was
never invoked. 84 As a result, in subtracting the U.S. related
than its fair value. 19 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976). This less than fair value determination increasingly took the form of a mathematical price comparison test: the United States selling price
compared to an approximation of foreign market value of the merchandise under investigation. Note, Treasury Runs the Maze: Less Than Fair Value Determinations Under the Antidumping Act of 1921, 8 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 919, 922 (1978); see 19 U.S.C. § 161(a) (1976).
80. This is a particularly acute problem. A report of the United Nations Centre on
Transnational Corporations notes that 46% of total U.S. imports and 45% of total U.S. exports have been "intra-firm." Transnational Corporations in World Development: a Reexamination, 4 U.N. Doc. E./C. 10/38, 43 (1978).
81. In determining the United States selling price of the merchandise under investigation, the Treasury used either the purchase price or the exporter's sales price of the mer~
chandise. When a foreign producer had an affiliated United States reseller, the relevant
price for comparison purposes was the exporter's sales price, defined as "the price at which
such merchandise is sold or agreed to be sold in the United States, before or after the time
of importation, by or for the account of the exporter," with certain adjustments. 19 U.S.C. §
163 (1976) (emphasis added).
82. Id.
83. See SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, TRADE REFORM ACT OF 1974, s. REP. No. 1298,
93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 174-77 (1974).
84. The Trade Reform Act of 1974 added a new section 205(d) which provided that if
an MNC had production and sale facilities in two or more foreign countries, only one of
which supplied the U.S. market, then the home market price of the entity actually supplying
the U.S. was to be disregarded if another related entity supplied non-U.S. markets with the
same goods at higher prices than those at which such merchandise was sold to the United
States. 19 U.S.C. § 164(d) (1976); see Ehrenhaft, Multinational Enterprises, supra note 74, at
281. However, this section is triggered only if MNC sales in the home exporting country are
non-existent or too few to provide an adequate basis for price comparison with U.S. sales
and ignores the possibility that a MNC could subsidize both sales to the U.S. and home
market, thereby allowing sufficient home market sales to force the use of the normal foreign
market procedure. Thus, the subsidized price of the home market sales would be low, so
that if the foreign market value were compared to the United States sales price, no dumping determination would result, enabling the MNC to succeed at underselling American
competition while avoiding the assessment of a dumping duty. See Note, Treasury Runs
The Maze: Less Than Fair Value Determinations Under the Antidumping Act of 1921,
supra note 79, at 937.

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol7/iss2/7

16

Silverman: Antidumping Provisions

1979-80]

Antidumping Provisions

255

party's selling expenses from its resale prices in order to reach
the figure to be compared with the foreign market value of the
goods, no allowance was made for the reseller's profits. 85 The related party thus held an advantage over unrelated sales agencies
which must earn a profit to survive.
The Trade Agreements Act does address, though imperfectly,
the operations of MNC's. Section 773(d) of the Act provides that
where merchandise exported to the U.S. is produced by a multinational corporation and where sales of such or similar goods do
not exist or are inadequate as a basis for comparison of U.S. sales
with those in the country of exportation, and where, in addition,
the foreign market value outside the country of exportation is
greater than the value within the exporting country, the applied
value shall be the foreign market value at the time of exportation
of such goods sold in substantial quantities in other countries.
Such calculation will involve adjustments for differences in the
costs of production, including taxes, labor, materials and overhead, where such differences are satisfactorily demonstrated as
well as the costs of packaging and shipping. 86 Although this provision is an improvement over prior law, it still fails to encompass
situations involving "intra-firm" sales and may well fail in practice.
The Act fails to address the situation where MNC's with diversified production and distribution facilities acquire components
of products from another country at less than fair value prices
which are then assembled for sale to the U.S. The products might
later be sold at uniformly low prices in both the home market of
their assembly and the United States. Further, U.S. multinational
corporations will likely be unwilling to invoke the antidumping
provisions of the Trade Agreements Act either because they do
not feel that the pressure of import competition can be meaningfully addressed through the antidumping proceedings or
because they fear retaliation against their export sales. 87 Thus, in

1

85. A deduction was required to be made in computing exporter's sales price only for
the amount of the commissions, if any, for selling in the United States the particular merchandise under consideration, by an amount equal to the expenses, if
any, generally incurred by or for the account of the exporter in the United States
in selling identical or substantially identical merchandise.
19 U.S.C. § 163 (1976) (emphasis added).
86. Trade Agreements Act, supra note 3, at§ 773(d) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(d)).
87. Ehrenhaft, Antidumping and Trade Policy, supra note 20, at 1376. However, as
the author notes, steel and chemical companies are exceptions.
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substance and in terms of enforceability, the new provision may
inadequately address abuses or price-discriminatory strategies
practiced by multinational corporations.

VL

POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES FOR
LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

The "Tokyo Declaration," which gave the Tokyo Round its
name and established its terms of reference, called for "improvements in the international framework for the conduct of
world trade" 88 and recognized the need to adopt "differential
measures" in order to give developing countries "special and more
favorable treatment ... in areas of the negotiation where this is
feasible and appropriate." 89 This principle encompasses a rule of
"graduation" to permit LDC's to take on increased responsibilities
under GA TT as their levels of development advance. It also
reflects the qualified success of LDC's in convincing the international community to permit some forms of special treatment for
their exports. 90 However, these calls by LDC's for easier access to
developed country markets have largely gone unheeded. 91
The bargaining power of developing countries was weakened
in the recently completed Tokyo Round by their strong, continuous opposition to the principle of reciprocity 92 and their later
demand for a departure from the most-favored-nation (MFN)
clause, 93 which are the cornerstones of GATT, to make possible
the introduction of a one-way preferential system for LDC's. 94 The
MTN Antidumping Agreement did recognize, however, that
88. Declaration of Ministers, supra note 6, at 22.
89. Id. at 21. Graham, Reforming the International Trading System: The Tokyo
Round Trade Negotiations in The Final Stage, 12 CORNELL INT'L L.J. l, 27-28 (1979).
90. One result of this effort was the adoption of the Generalized System of
Preferences, which allows selected exports from LDC's to enter the markets of developed
countries at lower duty rates than those applied to the same products from developed countries. See Graham, The U.S. Generalized System of Preferences for Developing Countries:
International Innovation and the Art of the Possible, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 513 (1978).
91. See YEATS, TRADE BARRIERS FACING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1979); Nowzad, Differential Trade Treatment for LDC's, FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT (1978) at 16.
92. Reciprocity is essentially the principle of "give and take" which implies mutuality
of gains and the granting of equivalent concessions.
93. The MFN clause contained in Article II of the GA TT is a principle of nondiscrimination and calls for the automatic and unconditional extension of concessions to all
other contracting parties. See BISD, supra note 6, at 2.
94. A thorough discussion of this debate is contained in Ibrahim, Developing Countries and the Tokyo Round, 12 J. WORLD TRADE L. l, 3 (1978).
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special attention must be given by developed countries to the
situation of developing countries when considering the application
of antidumping measures. That Agreement called for the exploration of possible "constructive" remedies before applying antidumping duties where the duties would effect the essential interests of LDC's. 95 Despite this MTN recommendation, however,
the Trade Agreements Act contains no such flexibility in the provision of "constructive" remedies and treats dumping by LDC's in
a manner similar to dumping by developed countries. Thus, the
development goals of LDC's are extraneous to U.S. antidumping
decisions inasmuch as LDC's would be subject to automatic remedies if a dumping determination were made.
Developing countries have long recognized the importance of
market access for their exports to developed countries. LDC's concern for their future development has grown with the increased
incidence of protection in developed market economies and with
the realization that trade barriers often impact disproportionately
on products exported by developing countries. 96 LDC's have expressed particular concern over protection, such as antidumping
measures, granted in response to claims that their exports are
disrupting domestic markets. Two important concerns have been
raised by the developing countries. First, while they view
safeguard action as both necessary and appropriate in many circumstances, they seek some guarantee that such action will be
temporary in nature and will take into consideration the disruption in their own economies and markets that follows the imposition of dumping duties or other protectionist measures. Second,
LDC's want it to be clearly and factually established that developing country imports are responsible for the "material injury"
suffered by a domestic industry prior to the imposition of any protectionist response. 97
LDC's are justifiably concerned about antidumping measures
such as those contained in the Trade Agreements Act. If they are
unable to sell their products in the United States, alternative
95. Antidumping Agreement, supra note 22, at pt. I, art. 13, reprinted in MT A, supra
note 2, at 325. See generally, MTN, Differential and More Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries, MTN/FR/W/20/Rev. 2 (1979), reprinted
in MT A at 622-61.
96. Sampson, Contemporary Protectionism and Exports of Developing Countries, 8
WORLD DEVELOPMENT 113 (1980).
97. Id. at 116-17.
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outlets must be sought. This is frequently an arduous undertaking. LDC's have argued that their exports are frequently used as
scapegoats to mask internal structural problems in the country of
importation. One commentator has observed that import growth
has not significantly affected the growth of output or employment
in the United States.98 In the field of textiles, an industry frequently
the subject of dumping investigations or voluntary restraint
agreements, recent studies have revealed that imports of textiles
from developing countries accounted for less than 2.50/o of U.S.
consumption and less than 100/o of the consumption of clothing in
1975. Moreover, developing countries are net importers of the
intermediate goods and raw materials for the manufacture of
clothing and .other textile goods. 99
LDC's have posited that protectionist measures, such as the
imposition of dumping duties, employed against developing countries are ill-chosen because the exports of manufactured goods
from developed countries to developing nations have increased
substantially more than their imports from LDC's. Moreover,
LDC's argue that the loss of jobs in import-competing industries is
not due to increased imports but is the result of the ; failure of
developed countries to keep pace with technological innovation
and the diffusion of production technology and ability .100 It is
argued that protectionism will reduce pressures for productivity
and cost-efficiency improvements in import-competing industries.
National incomes will subsequently decline because resources will
not be used to the best advantage and potential economies of scale
will not be realized. 101
The increasing employment of state trading by developing
countries to improve their bargaining power, expand exports,
provide central planning, raise revenue for the government, diversify the geographical and commodity structure of exports, and
lower costs may increase exposure to the risk of a dumping find98. Krueger, Effects of Exports from New Industrial Countries on U.S. Industries, in
GROWTH, TRADE AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN AN OPEN AUSTRALIAN ECONOMY

& T.

Perry, eds.

15 (W.

Kasper

1978).

99. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, HANDBOOK OF INTERNA(1979).
100. See Franko, Multinationals: The End of U.S. Dominance, 56 HARV. Bus. REV. 95
(1978).
101. Balassa, World Trade and the International Economy: Trends, Prospects and
Policies, WORLD BANK STAFF WORKING PAPER No. 282 at 33-35 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
TIONAL TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT STATISTICS

Balassa].
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ing. 102 As a result, such risk may induce LDC producers to limit exports to the United States for fear of financial loss in the form of
payments of additional duties or bonds which may strain the
LDC's treasury .103 Thus, LDC sales of products at less than fair
value to capture market share will likely be curtailed. It may be
argued that LDC's will be acutely disadvantaged because market
forces as well as the benefits obtained by shifts to lower-cost
sources will be foregone, thereby freezing existing patterns,
discriminating against new producers, and obstructing potential
changes in comparative trade advantage. 10'
VIL

CONCLUSION

The principle objectives of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) are the progressive reduction of barriers to
trade and·the diversion of trade flows according to the free trade
principle. Its goal is to increase the economic welfare of its contracting parties. 105 The Trade Agreements Act is an attempt to
codify such principles. While imperfect, its failings cannot be attributed to American protectionism alone but must be viewed as a
reflection of worldwide protectionist sentiment. 106
The purposes of the antidumping provisions of the Trade
Agreements Act are to discourage price discrimination practices
and the sale of unfairly priced import goods in the United States,
and to offer remedies for the injury suffered by domestic industry
when such practices occur. It is, in essence, intended to be preventive and not punitive. Nevertheless the Act, which in both
design and application will present undue hardships to foreign
producers and developing countries, fails to adequately address
the global operations of multinational corporations and is susceptible to protectionist designs.
The Act places greater restrictions on the practices of foreign
producers selling in the U.S. market than are applied to domestic
102. See Kostecki, State Trading in Ind'U8trialized and Developing Countries, 12 J.
187, 188 (1978).
103. See Balassa, supra note 101, at 15; Balassa, The 'New Protectionism' and the
International Economy, 12 J. WORLD TRADE L. 409, 418 (1978).
104. Id at 425.
105. See generally, K. DAM, THE GATT-LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
ORGANIZATION (1970).
106. See Jackson, The Crumbling Institutions of the Liberal Trading System, 12 J.
WORLD TRADE L. 93 (1978), for an insightful analysis of the causes of crisis in the international liberal trade system and in the effectiveness of GA TT.
WORLD TRADE L.
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producers. U.S. producers are not likely to suffer governmentally
imposed financial burdens if they sell at less than full cost as long
as they do not sell below average variable cost. 107 Further, the Act
fails to adequately distinguish between dumping by inadvertence
or as the result of rational business decisions to introduce new
products, test new markets, or reduce surplus or outdated inventories, and intentional, predatory dumping to eliminate competition in order to gain market control. Moreover, it ignores the particular needs of LDC's whereby sales practices are fostered by
government policies aimed at maintaining employment levels, obtaining foreign exchange needed to finance internal development,
or to help alleviate chronic balance-of-payment deficits.
Finally, due to the difficulty of ascertaining a foreign market
price for imported goods, the danger exists that the new antidumping provisions will be undermined by protectionist ends. One
result may be that domestic industries which are overly concentrated and inefficient or sell at inflated prices will be shielded
from the healthy competition provided by lower priced imports.
The Code promulgated in the Tokyo Round and the Trade
Agreements Act are steps in the right direction. Further steps
are required, however, if the ideal of free trade is ever to be
achieved.
107. See Chillicothe Sand & Gravel Co. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 615 F.2d 427 (7th Cir.
1980) (no predatory pricing or Sherman Act violation where defendant's prices were above
average variable cost).
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APPENDIX
CHART 1

ANTIDUMPING INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURE-ANTIDUMPING ACT OF 1921
CUSTOMS

TREASURY

I
I

CASE FILED

-

r

TECHNICAL BRANCH,
DUTY ASSESSMENT
DIVISION :
INVESTIGATION

OFFICE OF TARIFF
AFFAIRS REVIEW OF
PETITION(note a)

l

I NOTICE OF INITIATION

I

OF INVESTIGATION

ITC

TIMEFRAMES

I
30 D \YS

I

I

OFFICE OF
INVESTIGATION
OVERSEAS
INVESTIGATION &
VERIFICATION

IIDECISION
REVIEW OF CUSTOMS I
BY OFFICE OF
TARIFF AFFAIRS,

RECOMMENDATION
TO CUSTOMS
COMMISSIONER

I
WITHOLDING OF
APPRAISEMENT
(DISTRICT DIRECTORS)

l

TENTATIVE DECISION :
SALES AT LTFV;
GENERAL COUNSEL

l

6 TO 9
MONTHS

I

INOTICE OF WITH OLDING I

I

OF APPRAISEMENT

I

l

I

l

I

3 MONTHS

I

I

I FINDING OF DUMPING I

I

I

I
DETERMINATION
OF FINAL MARGIN
AND PREPARATION
OF MASTERLISTS

PRESENTATION OF
VIEWS ON LTFV
DETERMINATION

FINAL LTFV
DETERMINATION
(GENERAL COUNSEL,
SECRETARY)

l

I

I
I

I

I

INJURY
INVESTIGATION
(OFFICE OF
INVESTIGATION)

l

DETERMINATION
OF INJURY
(COMMISSIONERS)

I
I

I

3 MONTHS

3 TO 3 1/1

ASSESSMENT/
COLLECTION
OF DUTIES

YE1RS

a BY AMENDMENT IN THE TRADE ACT OF 1974, TREASURY AT THIS STAGE COULD REQUEST A PRELIMI·
NARY INDICATION OF INJURY DECISION FROM THE ITC.
SOURCE: COMPTROLLER GENERAL, U.S. ADMINISTRATION OF THE ANTIDUMPING ACT OF
REPORT TO CONGRESS

Published by SURFACE, 1980

1921,

3 (G.A.0. 1979).
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CHART2
ANTIDUMPTING CASES
(Statutory Deadlines)-TRADE AGREEMENTS ACT OF 1979
DAY 1-PETITION FILED WITH THE ADMINISTERING AUTHORITY AND THE
ITC
(If self-initiated by Administering Authority no action required on day 20)
DAY 20-INITIATION DECISION BY THE ADMINISTERING AUTHORITY
(The ITC is informed. If the decision is negative, the case is terminated.)
DAY 45-REASONABLE INDICATION OF INJURY DETERMINATION BY THE ITC
(If the decision is negative the case is terminated)
PRELIMINARY DETERMINATION
OF SLFV

DAY

FINAL AFFIRMATIVE DETER·
MINATION OF SLFV

(If

ITC INJURY
DETERMINATION

negative, case terminated)

- - - - - - - - D a y 1 8 5 - - - - - - - - - - - - - D a y 230
AFFIRMA TIVEb
· - - - - - - - - D a y 2 4 5 - - - - - - - - - - - - - D a y 290
(if exporters request an extension)
fA~110

(if verification waived)

~

- - - - - - - - • D a y 1 8 5 ' - - - - - - - - - - - - - D a y 260
NEGATIVE _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _..,Day 2 4 5 ' - - - - - - - - - - - - - Day 320

(if petitioner requests an extension)

.~-------..... Day~5---------------Day280

AFFIRMATIV

~-------..... Day

295 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - D a y 340
(if exporters request an extension)

for

8~160

(normal case)

~

----------Day~''-------------

Day310

N E G A T I V E · - - - - - - - - - Day 2 9 5 • · - - - - - - - - - - - - - Day 370
(if petitioner requests an extension)

~

- - - - - - - - D a y 2 8 5 - - - - - - - - - - - - - • D a y 330
AFFIRMATIVE·-------~
Day 3 4 5 - - - - - - - - - - - - - . . , D a y 390

~

(if exporter requests an extension)

for C)-!10 (extraordinarily complicated case or at petitioner's request)

~

· - - - - - - - - - D a y 2 8 5 ' ' - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Day 360
N E G A T I V E - - - - - - - - - Day 3 4 5 ' ' - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Day 420
(if petitioner requests an extension)

b. LIQUIDATION SUSPENDED.

Source: Ehrenhaft, What the A ntid:umping and Countervailing Duty Provisions of the Trade
Agreements Act {Can] {Will] {Should] Mean for U.S. Trade Policy, 11 LAW & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 1361, 1370-71 (1979)
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